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10/09/93
Report blames Koresh; FBI cleared in raid that led to deaths
By Steve McGonigle / The Dallas Morning News
WASHINGTON - David Koresh, not the FBI, orchestrated the holocaust that ended his Branch Davidian sect's standoff with federal agents, said a report on the Justice Department's role released Friday.
While agents disagreed over tactics, and their assessment of a mass suicide risk proved wrong, the FBI's overall handling of the 51-day crisis was thorough and professional, the report stated.
The report's author, Edward Dennis, said agents had contradictory evidence about Mr. Koresh's suicidal tendencies and legitimate law enforcement reasons for seeking to end the stalemate.
There was "no evidence" that the FBI caused the fire that destroyed the complex near Waco, Mr. Dennis stated. "In the final analysis," he wrote, "the deaths of the Davidians were caused by David Koresh."
In another part of the review, Justice Department investigators said they found no proof of child abuse inside the compound - a reason that Attorney General Janet Reno cited for approving the assault on the cultists' home in April.
Ms. Reno, who had said after the fatal fire that she was responsible for the actions taken, acknowledged Friday that she misunderstood officials who briefed her about the child abuse allegations.
"I go out to seek the truth, and that's what I've tried to do here," she said of the report.
Mr. Dennis, a Philadelphia lawyer and former assistant attorney general, was commissioned by the Justice Department to review its role in the standoff and subsequent deaths of at least 80 Branch Davidians.
The review was based on Mr. Dennis' evaluation of more than 800 interviews conducted by FBI agents and information he obtained through his own interviews with an unstated number of officials.
The department also released a chronology of the siege compiled by Justice Department attorneys and the FBI as well as reports from nine outside experts on FBI hostage negotiation methods.
Unlike a scathing review of the Treasury Department's role released last week, Mr. Dennis' report aimed few barbs at anyone besides Mr. Koresh, the charismatic cult leader who called himself Jesus Christ.
Sound planning
The report credited on-site commanders with sound planning and BMs. Reno for making a well-reasoned decision to authorize the FBI tear-gas assault.
That failed - and an inferno erupted - because Mr. Koresh wanted to fulfill his apocalyptic prophecies rather than lose control over his followers or face capital murder charges, the report contended.
The cult leader was depicted as paranoid, delusional and obsessed with death.
Mr. Koresh and at least 79 followers later were found dead inside the compound. Thirteen of the cultists, including Mr. Koresh, died from gunshot wounds. In a new revelation, the report said a number ofchildren were fatally shot, stabbed and beaten to death.
Their deaths, coupled with the slayings of four Treasury Department agents during a Feb. 28 raid on the compound, marked one of the bloodiest episodes in American law enforcement history. The agents were serving warrants based on allegations that the cult was stockpiling illegal weapons.
Nine other cult members escaped from the blaze, and some are facing trial on a variety of federal charges in Waco.
The Treasury Department's report strongly faulted the planning and execution of the raid by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and accused five senior officials of attempting to cover up mistakes.
Two of the reports released Friday - Mr. Dennis' and the chronology - were marked "redacted." Justice department officials said the exclusions were mandated by federal wiretapping laws.
Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann said the release of the reports had been delayed for several days by efforts to keep editing to a minimum. Some of the missing material is "newsworthy," he said.
The sharpest criticisms of the Justice Department came not from the overall review by Mr. Dennis but from the outside experts recruited by the department to make recommendations for handling future crises.
Ignored analysis
Dr. Nancy Ammerman, a professor of sociology and religion, concluded that FBI commanders in Waco ignored the analysis of their own behavioral science experts about Mr. Koresh's suicidal tendencies and relied on outside experts unfamiliar with non-mainstream religions.
"Arguments for patience and unconventional tactics fell on deaf ears," Dr. Ammerman, a visiting professor at Princeton University, wrote in her analysis of the FBI's performance.
Eight other experts issued separate evaluations of the FBI's negotiation methods and tactical moves. One expert, Dr. Alan Stone of Harvard University, will issue his report at a later time.
Mr. Heymann described the experts' reports as "interesting, stimulating (and) hard-hitting." He also said that he did not agree with all the conclusions or recommendations.
In his own report, Mr. Heymann suggested that the major reform needed was to double the size of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team and provide more integrated training with negotiators and behavioral scientists.
He acknowledged, however, that such reforms would not have changed the outcome in Waco but may be helpful in future terrorist situations.
Mr. Heymann said the reports would be sent to the FBI's new director, Louis Freeh, to determine whether any disciplinary actions were warranted. No such action was mentioned in any of the reports.
William Sessions, who was FBI director during the Waco crisis, could not be reached for comment. His wife, Alice, said during a brief telephone interview that her husband had not seen reports and was interviewed for it.
The reports indicate that in March, Mr. Sessions independently contacted one of Mr. Koresh's former lawyers to discuss whether that attorney would help negotiate. FBI officials persuaded Mr. Sessions to drop the idea.
Not a `whitewash'
Mr. Heymann, Mr. Dennis and Ms. Reno, appearing at a joint news conference, rejected suggestions that the Justice Department's review amounted to "a whitewash" of its performance in Waco.
"We can't come out with scapegoats when there is no severe blame to be placed," Mr. Heymann said.
When a reporter said the review had cleared her, she shot back, "I don't think any of us came to seek vindication."
The chairman of the House Judiciary subcommittee that oversees the FBI said he was disappointed that Mr. Dennis' report was not more critical of the dominance that tactical commanders exercised over negotiators.
"It seems to us that the report indicates that if a similar situation came up, that the same tactics would be used," Rep. Don Edwards, D-Calif., said in an interview.
Mr. Dennis' report lauded the negotiation team and acknowledged that it was incensed by a series of decisions by tactical commanders to increase psychological pressure on the Davidians to surrender.
During the first month, as 35 cult members were permitted to leave, negotiators believed that techniques like playing loud music and shining bright spotlights sent a punitive message.
Negotiators complained that they were not consulted before tactical decisions were implemented and felt that they were being isolated from the on-scene commanders, the Dennis report stated.
The report repeatedly stressed that the FBI was aware of the possibility that Mr. Koresh might lead his followers in a mass suicide reminiscent of the Rev. Jim Jones' actions at Jonestown.
The report cited a March 8 memo from FBI behavioral scientists that noted "a mass suicide ordered by Koresh cannot be discounted." Such a directive "would be his effort to maintain the ultimate control over his group, in the event of his death," the memo stated.
Late that month, the report said, FBI agents learned that Mr.
Koresh had planned to blow up himself and his followers but aborted the plan at the last minute because he received a message from God "to wait."
Concerns about a mass suicide prompted negotiators on several occasions to ask Mr. Koresh and his chief aide, Steve Schneider, if the Davidians were thinking of killing themselves. Each time, the report said, negotiators were assured that no such action was being planned.
"I would lose myself for all eternity," Mr. Schneider is quoted as telling a negotiator during one telephone conversation.
The decision to launch a tear-gas assault on the compound was made after a series of pressure tactics had failed and outside experts advised the FBI that further negotiations would be fruitless.
Mr. Dennis stated the gas option was considered for a month before it was presented to Ms. Reno on April 12. After rejecting the idea once, the attorney general agreed five days later, the report said.
Realistic options
The decision was well-informed, Mr. Dennis stated. "All reasonable alternatives were considered and the decision to insert CS gas was a reasonable one," Mr. Dennis wrote. "I conclude that an indefinite siege was not a realistic option."
At the news conference, Mr. Dennis said that child abuse allegations were voiced during the decision-making process but were only one of many factors considered by Ms. Reno and other top officials for the timing of the assault.
He cited as other factors fatigue among members of the Hostage Rescue Team and concerns that the FBI could not maintain the security perimeter it had established around the cult compound.
Ms. Reno said she misunderstood the child abuse allegation. She said she believed the allegation was based on information gathered after the siege began when, in fact, it was based on earlier accusations.
Mr. Dennis' report noted that arson investigators had concluded that the fire that engulfed the compound was deliberately set from inside.
"The fire that occurred on April 19th was not caused by the tear-gas assault," he said. "I think that the evidence is overwhelming."
Richard Scruggs, a special assistant to Ms. Reno who helped to compile the chronology, conceded that he was troubled by a videotape which shows a flash as a tank pulls away from the building.
He said the tape is being analyzed at the University of Maryland and preliminary results show that the flash may have been the dispersing agent for the tear gas, which is not flammable.
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